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Perfect Competition

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Abstract

This article attempts a critical appraisal of the literature on perfect competition as it has evolved since the work of Debreu–Scarf and Aumann in the 1960s, following papers of Debreu–Scarf and Aumann. It focuses on mathematical techniques that have been garnered to cope with the presuppositions of the classical theory relating to finitude, convexity and agent-independence.

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Ali Khan, M. (2018). Perfect Competition. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1633

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