The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Perfect Competition

  • M. Ali Khan
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1633

Abstract

This article attempts a critical appraisal of the literature on perfect competition as it has evolved since the work of Debreu–Scarf and Aumann in the 1960s, following papers of Debreu–Scarf and Aumann. It focuses on mathematical techniques that have been garnered to cope with the presuppositions of the classical theory relating to finitude, convexity and agent-independence.

Keywords

Additivity Aggregation Arrow–Debreu model of general equilibrium Central limit theorems Competitive equilibrium Consumptions sets Convexity Core equivalence Cores Correspondences Equilibrium Existence of general equilibrium Externalities Fixed-point theorems Game theory Hayek, F. A. Hyperplanes Idealized limit economy Incentive compatibility Independence Infinite commodities Large games Law of large numbers Lindahl equilibrium Lyapunov theorem Marginal cost pricing Measure spaces Negligibility Non-convexity Perfect competition Probability Public goods Returns to scale Shapley–Folkman theorem Steinitz’s theorem Wald, A. 
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Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Ali Khan
    • 1
  1. 1.