The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd


  • Roberto Serrano
Reference work entry


This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed.


Asymmetric information Bargaining Bayesian equilibrium Edgeworth, F. Game theory Harsanyi, J. Hicks, J. Incomplete information Independence of irrelevant alternatives Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution Morgenstern, O. Nash equilibrium Nash solution Nash’s demand game Pareto efficiency Rational behaviour Risk aversion Subgame perfect equilibrium Ultimatum game Von Neumann, J. Walrasian outcomes Zeuthen, F 

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Serrano
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