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Bargaining

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

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Abstract

This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5

    Roberto Serrano

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  1. Roberto Serrano
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Serrano, R. (2018). Bargaining. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_159

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