The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Non-cooperative Games

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr.
Reference work entry


Game theory analyses multi-agent situations in which the payoff to an agent is dependent not only upon his own actions but also on the actions of others. Zero-sum games assume that the payoffs to the players always sum to zero. In that case, the interests of the players are diametrically opposed. In non-zero-sum games, there is typically room for cooperation as well as conflict.

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.