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Rational Behaviour

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

A clear distinction must be drawn between (a) the type of behaviour that might be described as rational, and (b) rational behaviour models that might be useful in making predictions about actual behaviour. Neither of the two standard views of rational behaviour – as ‘consistent choice’ or as ‘self-interest maximization’ – has emerged as an adequate representation of rationality or of actuality. The difficulties that these views encounter carry over to rational behaviour models accommodating uncertainty.

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    Amartya Sen

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Sen, A. (2018). Rational Behaviour. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1568

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