Rent control generically describes a range of regulations governing rents, as well as related contract features such as security of tenure and required maintenance. There is debate in the literature about the efficacy of controls based on (1) whether the housing market is best modelled as a competitive market, or one where landlords have market power; and (2) whether regulators have sufficient information and appropriate mechanisms to improve imperfect market outcomes. Many empirical studies find that rent controls score badly as redistributive systems. Many basic questions, especially regarding dynamic effects on the supply of housing, have yet to be credibly answered.
KeywordsAsymmetrical information Housing markets Housing supply Loss aversion Market power Property taxation Rent control Tax incidence
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