The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Arrow’s Theorem

  • Kenneth J. Arrow
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_137

Abstract

Any satisfactory method of making a social choice should be in some measure representative of the individual criteria which enter into it, should use the range of possible actions, and should observe consistency conditions among the choices made for different data sets. Arrow’s Theorem, or the Impossibility Theorem, states that there is no social choice mechanism which satisfies such reasonable conditions and which will be applicable to any arbitrary set of individual criteria. This article sets out the proof of the theorem.

Keywords

Arrow’s th Bentham J. Compensation principle Condorcet Marquis de Constitutions Edgeworth F. Hicks J. Impossibility th Independence of irrelevant alternatives Intransitivity Kaldor N. Pareto principle Preference orderings Rawls J. Scitovsky T. Sidgwick H. Single-peaked preferences Social choice Social welfare function Voting 

JEL Classifications

D7 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenneth J. Arrow
    • 1
  1. 1.