Abstract
The Shapley value is an a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person game. Introduced by Lloyd S. Shapley in 1953, it has become a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. The Shapley value has been applied to economic, political, and other models.
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Hart, S. (2018). Shapley Value. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1369
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1369
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