Skip to main content

Strategic Behaviour and Market Structure

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
  • 44 Accesses

Abstract

Since Bain (1959) the predominant framework for analysis in industrial organization has been the structure-conduct-performance approach. As described in Scherer (1980), this starts with the premise that market structure is determined by basic conditions in an industry, like technology and demand elasticity. Market structure then affects the behaviour of firms which determines economic performance. Traditionally, research in industrial organization has taken market structure as being exogenously determined and has analysed the effects of market structure on firms’ conduct and economic performance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 6,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 8,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Bain, J. 1959. Industrial organization. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caves, R., and M. Porter. 1977. From entry barriers: Conjectural decisions and contrived deterrence to new competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91: 241–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dixit, A. 1980. The role of investment in entry deterrence. Economic Journal 90: 95–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eaton, B.C., and R. Lipsey. 1979. The theory of market pre-emption: The persistence of excess capacity and monopoly in growing spatial markets. Economica 46: 149–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Encaoua, D., P. Geroski, and A. Jacquemin. 1986. Strategic competition and the persistence of dominant firms: A survey. In New developments in the analysis of market structure, ed. J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flaherty, M.T. 1980. Dynamic limit pricing, barriers to entry, and rational firms. Journal of Economic Theory 23: 160–182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. 1983. Learning-by-doing and market performance. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 522–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geroski, P., and A. Jacquemin. 1984. Dominant firms and their alleged decline. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2: 1–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, R., and D. Newbery. 1982. Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review 72: 514–526.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrington, J. 1984. Noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry-deterring signal. Rand Journal of Economics 15: 426–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D., and A.M. Spence. 1985. Modelling the role of history in industrial organization and competition. In Issues in contemporary microeconomics and welfare, ed. G.R. Feiwel. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 253–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P., and D.J. Roberts. 1982a. Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis. Econometrica 50: 443–459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P., and D.J. Roberts. 1982b. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 280–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salop, S. 1979. Strategic entry deterrence. American Economic Review 69: 335–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salop, S., and D. Scheffman. 1983. Raising rivals’ costs. American Economic Review 73: 267–271.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scherer, F. 1980. Industrial market structure and economic performance, 2nd ed. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, R. 1978. Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereals industry. Bell Journal of Economics 9: 305–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, R. 1982. Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands. American Economic Review 72: 349–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmalensee, R. 1983. Advertising and entry deterrence: An exploratory model. Journal of Political Economy 91: 636–653.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R. 1975. Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory 4: 25–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spence, A.M. 1979. Investment strategy and growth in a new market. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ware, R. 1984. Sunk costs and strategic commitment: A proposed three-stage equilibrium. Economic Journal 94: 370–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waterson, M. 1984. Economic theory of the industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Copyright information

© 2018 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Harrington, J.E. (2018). Strategic Behaviour and Market Structure. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1317

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics