The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Strategic Behaviour and Market Structure

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr.
Reference work entry


Since Bain (1959) the predominant framework for analysis in industrial organization has been the structure-conduct-performance approach. As described in Scherer (1980), this starts with the premise that market structure is determined by basic conditions in an industry, like technology and demand elasticity. Market structure then affects the behaviour of firms which determines economic performance. Traditionally, research in industrial organization has taken market structure as being exogenously determined and has analysed the effects of market structure on firms’ conduct and economic performance.

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© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph E. HarringtonJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.