The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

2018 Edition
| Editors: Macmillan Publishers Ltd

Rank

  • M. J. Beckmann
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1290

Abstract

All men are equal, but members of an organization are not. Organizations are associations of persons for the achievement of tasks that exceed the capacity of an individual. These tasks must, therefore, be subdivided and the subtasks assigned to certain individual organization members, the operatives.

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. J. Beckmann
    • 1
  1. 1.