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Incentive Contracts

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Abstract

Incentives are the essence of economics. The most basic concept, demand, considers how to induce a consumer to buy more of a particular good; that is, how to give him an incentive to purchase. Similarly, supply relationships are descriptions of how agents respond with more output or labour to additional compensation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-349-95121-5

    Edward P. Lazear

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  1. Edward P. Lazear
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Lazear, E.P. (2018). Incentive Contracts. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1156

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