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Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

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Abstract

Although we all make interpersonal utility comparisons, many economists and philosophers argue that our limited information about other people’s minds renders them meaningless. If they are possible, interpersonal comparisons of utility differences must be distinguished from interpersonal comparisons of utility levels. Utilitarianism must assume the interpersonal comparability of utility differences to maximize a social welfare function, while Rawls’s maximin principle requires interpersonal comparability of utility levels. Adopting an ordinalist or a cardinalist view of utility functions restricts the positions one can consistently take as to interpersonal comparability of utilities.

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Harsanyi, J.C. (2018). Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1119

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