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Interdependent Preferences

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Abstract

Interdependent preferences arise in economic theory in the study of both individual decisions and group decisions. We imagine that a decision is required among alternatives in a set X and that the decision will depend on preferences between the elements in X. If the preferences represent different points of view about the relative desirability of the alternatives, of if they are based on multiple criteria that impinge on the decision, then we encounter the possibility of interdependent preferences.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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Fishburn, P.C. (2008). Interdependent Preferences. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_934-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_934-2

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-95121-5

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Interdependent Preferences
    Published:
    31 March 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_934-2

  2. Original

    Interdependent Preferences
    Published:
    24 November 2016

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_934-1