Abstract
Firms may have efficiency or strategic incentives to share information about current and past behaviour or intended future conduct. This article examines those incentives and the welfare consequences from the perspective of static oligopoly and monopolistic competition models. It concludes with a review of the available evidence.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume
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Vives, X. (2008). Information Sharing Among Firms. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2238-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2238-1
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