Moral Dilemma Theory

Abstract

Many philosophers, theologians, and canonists in the Latin West during the twelfth through fifteenth centuries regularly considered whether an agent could ever face a necessary choice between sinful options. This medieval theorizing about the possibility of inescapable moral wrongdoing was usually framed in terms of whether an agent ever experiences genuine perplexity (perplexitas) or is genuinely perplexed (perplexus). Medieval theorists often conceptualized a moral dilemma to consist of a pair of contradictories, where an agent must select between an act and its omission, both of which are morally prohibited or sinful. The high level of theorizing about moral dilemmas in the medieval period occasioned the gradual development and clarification of a variety of moral principles that are still discussed in present-day philosophical literature. These principles include “ought implies can,” “always choose the lesser evil,” and the principle of double effect. Discussing moral dilemmas became standardized with the practice of producing commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. Distinction 39 of Book II of that magisterial theological textbook became the locus classicus for discussions of perplexitas, and the issue also surfaced as a popular topic in quodlibetal disputations. The medieval debate over the existence of moral dilemmas was largely interdisciplinary, as earlier canon law theorizing greatly influenced later discussions among theologians and philosophers. The legal tradition provided thinkers not only with a distinctive terminology but also supplied many stock examples for discussion that at times featured agents in unusual situations.