Abstract
The chapter aims to provide a classification of different philosophical theories of well-being. A very common issue of contestation is whether well-being is subjective or objective. However, ontological and evaluative perspectives in this regard need to be disentangled. The ontological perspective is concerned with the problem whether well-being is a mode of consciousness or of existence. The evaluative perspective focuses on the criteria of well-being. There are then altogether four different accounts: (i) experience theories (ontological subjectivism), (ii) state-of-being theories (ontological objectivism), (iii) desire-fulfillment theories (evaluative subjectivism), and (iv) essence theories (evaluative objectivism). This classification is applied to a particular philosophical and social dispute, namely, whether and, if so, in what way disability undermines the quality of life of persons with disability.
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Acknowledgments
This chapter draws on material that has previously been published in the article “Comparative and Non-Comparative Perspectives on Disability” in Jerome Bickenbach, Franziska Felder, Barbara Schmitz (eds.), Disability and the Good Human Life, Cambridge University Press 2014, 72–92.
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Schramme, T. (2017). Subjective and Objective Accounts of Well-Being and Quality of Life. In: Schramme, T., Edwards, S. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8688-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8688-1_7
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