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Dworkin, Ronald - Theory of Rights

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 169–170.

  2. 2.

    Ibid., 193–194.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., 170–177.

  4. 4.

    A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 369–371.

  5. 5.

    Yowell’s careful textual analysis of the evolution of Dworkin’s views shows this clearly. See Paul Yowell, “A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of Rights,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 52, no. 1 (2007).

  6. 6.

    See, for example, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 191.

  7. 7.

    A Matter of Principle, 361. See also Taking Rights Seriously, 233–234.

  8. 8.

    Taking Rights Seriously, 272–273. Dworkin offers a similar statement of the idea in Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 330.

  9. 9.

    See Taking Rights Seriously, 176.

  10. 10.

    For further discussion, see Justice for Hedgehogs, 191–218, 327–378.

  11. 11.

    See, for instance, Taking Rights Seriously, 190–191.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., 198–200.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., 223–239, 66–78; A Matter of Principle, 335–372.

  14. 14.

    Taking Rights Seriously, 277.

  15. 15.

    Yowell, “A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of Rights,” 105–106. Yowell concludes that the accounts are, in fact, in tension.

  16. 16.

    For instance, the “rights as reasons” model is affirmed at Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 329. The “preference excluding model” is affirmed at Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 101–104.

  17. 17.

    Taking Rights Seriously, xi–xv.

  18. 18.

    Some of Dworkin’s discussion of preference exclusion seems to suppose complex rights by treating certain spheres of activity as prima facie protected from legislative intrusion. See, for example, ibid., 277.

  19. 19.

    Justice for Hedgehogs, 332–339.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., 335–336.

  21. 21.

    Jeremy Waldron, “Introduction,” in Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 17.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA

    Anthony R. Reeves

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  1. Anthony R. Reeves
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Correspondence to Anthony R. Reeves .

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  1. Center for International & Comparative Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, MD, USA

    Mortimer Sellers

  2. Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, University of Salzburg, Austria, Salzburg, Austria

    Stephan Kirste

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  1. Philosophy Department, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA

    Sally Scholz

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Reeves, A.R. (2018). Dworkin, Ronald - Theory of Rights. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_4-2

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Dworkin, Ronald - Theory of Rights
    Published:
    11 August 2018

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_4-2

  2. Original

    Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Rights
    Published:
    06 June 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_4-1

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