Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

Living Edition
| Editors: Mortimer Sellers, Stephan Kirste

Pettit, Philip

  • Andrei Poama
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_122-1

Introduction

Philip N. Pettit is Laurence S. Rockefeller university professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and distinguished professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He is also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, honorary member of the Royal Irish Academy, fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, and corresponding fellow of the British Academy. Pettit’s early work explores questions related to phenomenology (Pettit 1969) and structuralism (Pettit 1975), but he is now primarily associated with his analytic approach to political, social, and legal philosophy, as well as to the philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. Though these domains are systematically connected and would benefit from a joint reading, this entry will, for lack of space, deal only with his political, legal, and social philosophy.

Pettit was born to a Catholic family in Ballygar,...

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References

  1. Pettit P (1969) On the idea of phenomenology. Scepter Books, DublinGoogle Scholar
  2. Pettit P (1975) The concept of structuralism: a critical analysis. Gil and MacMillan, DublinGoogle Scholar
  3. Pettit P (1980) Judging justice: an introduction to contemporary political philosophy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, LondonGoogle Scholar
  4. Pettit P (1996a) The common mind: an essay on psychology, society and politics. Oxford University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Pettit P (1996b) Freedom as anti-power. Ethics 106:576–604CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Pettit P (1997a) Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  7. Pettit P (1997b) Republican theory and criminal punishment. Utilitas 9:59–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Pettit P (2001) A theory of freedom: from the psychology to the politics of agency. Polity Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  9. Pettit P (2002) Rules, reasons and norms: selected essays. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Pettit P (2007) Joining the dots. In: Smith M et al (eds) Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  11. Pettit P (2008) Three conceptions of democratic control. Constellations 15:46–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Pettit P (2009) Law and liberty. In: Besson S, Marti JL (eds) Legal republicanism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 39–59Google Scholar
  13. Pettit P (2010) A republican Law of Peoples. Eur J Polit Theory 9(1):70–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Pettit P (2012) On the people’s terms: a republican theory and model of democracy. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Pettit P (2014) Just freedom: a moral compass for a complex world. W.W. Norton, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  16. Pettit P, Braithwaite J (1990) Not just deserts: a republican theory of criminal justice. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  17. Pettit P, List C (2011) Group agency: the possibility, design and status of corporate agents. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  18. Pettit P, Marti JL (2010) A political philosophy in public life: civic republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  19. Pettit P, Baron M, Slote M (1997) Three methods of ethics: a debate. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Leiden UniversityLeidenThe Netherlands

Section editors and affiliations

  • Sally Scholz
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentVillanova UniversityVillanovaUSA