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Institutional Facts

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Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
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Introduction

Expressions which are used to refer to institutions are in some sense like theoretical terms. The word “state,” for example, does not refer to anything directly observable. We say that “the state” has some properties, or even that it does something, but all we can perceive are people and their doings (plus certain physical objects). “State” seems to have something in common with, say, “electron” or “ecosystem,” which are theoretical terms having a meaning only as parts of scientific theories. However, it is not only political scientists or legal theorists who use terms like “state.” Ordinary people have to deal with the state almost daily, and when referring to it, they do not usually suppose the truth of any scientific theory. These terms cannot be removed from our vocabulary. A scientist could claim that the extension of an established theoretical term is empty. The expression “state” is clearly different. The state as an institution could perhaps wither away, but it...

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Correspondence to Eerik Lagerspetz .

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Lagerspetz, E. (2017). Institutional Facts. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_103-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_103-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6730-0

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