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Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy pp 1–8Cite as

Legal Conventionalism

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Introduction

Conventionalism may be characterized as a position according to which a certain fact is (or is determined by) a convention. In other words, a conventionality thesis contains two main elements: a concept of convention and a particular, purportedly conventional, fact. Hence, in order to work out a particular conventionalist proposal it is necessary to offer an account of conventions and an account of the fact under analysis.

In the legal domain, even if it can be traced back to the conventionalist political philosophies of Hobbes and Hume, conventionalism has been framed following Herbert Hart’s insights about the concept of law. As we know, Hart argued that a necessary condition for there to be a legal system is the existence of a social practice between judges regarding the identification of law – famously known as “rule of recognition” (Hart 1961). Legal conventionalism purports to strengthen Hart’s original proposal by replacing the concept of social practice with the...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Conicet, Córdoba, Argentina

    Federico José Arena

Authors
  1. Federico José Arena
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Correspondence to Federico José Arena .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for International & Comparative Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

    Mortimer Sellers

  2. Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, University of Salzburg, Austria, Salzburg, Austria

    Stephan Kirste

Section Editor information

  1. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Patricia Mindus Ph.D

  2. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Sebastian Andres Reyes Molina

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Arena, F.J. (2017). Legal Conventionalism. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_101-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_101-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6730-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6730-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Law and CriminologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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