Is Smith a Real Virtue Ethicist?

Abstract

This chapter argues that Adam Smith is in fact a “real” virtue ethicist on the grounds that his moral theory (i) regards virtue as central; (ii) values virtue for its capacity to promote happiness; and (iii) believes that genuine happiness requires the cultivation of intellectual virtues including practical and theoretical wisdom. If correct, this matters for two reasons. First, it helps us better see the degree to which Smith’s system is founded on a commitment to the realization of genuine flourishing for both individuals and for communities, and thereby helps to dispel the all-too-persistent popular view that Smith ought to be regarded principally as a champion of simple utility maximization. Second, Smith offers us not only a real virtue ethics, but one that is particularly useful for us today. As others have noted, the conditions of modern commercial society today are much different from those of the aristocratic polis that formed the context in which and for which Aristotle developed his virtue ethics. If so, it may well be that Smith offers a virtue ethics better suited to our world than those of Aristotle and other ancient theorists.