Abstract
Neuroscience is a laboratory-based science that spans multiple levels of analysis from molecular genetics to behavior. At every level of analysis, experiments are designed in order to answer empirical questions about phenomena of interest. Understanding the nature and structure of experimentation in neuroscience is fundamental for assessing the quality of the evidence produced by such experiments and the kinds of claims that are warranted by the data. This chapter provides a general conceptual framework for thinking about evidence and experimentation in neuroscience with a particular focus on two research areas: cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology.
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Notes
- 1.
It is also relevant to note, that some investigators have sought to increase the ecological validity of fMRI experiments with innovative methods that allow for 3-D (as opposed to 2-D) objects to be used within the scanner (See Snow et al. 2011).
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Sullivan, J. (2015). Experimentation in Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Neurobiology. In: Clausen, J., Levy, N. (eds) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_108
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