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Unreliable Probabilities, Paradoxes, and Epistemic Risks

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Handbook of Risk Theory

Abstract

This paper explores the pros and cons of classical theories of rational decision-making and so-called generalized theories of decision-making. It argues that even if they teach us a great deal about rationality and sound decision-making, and are very useful tools, theories of this kind have serious limitations. In particular they breakdown in the presence of epistemic risk and where there is value uncertainty. It is argued that in these situations we need to take a Socratic approach to risk analysis and risk management.

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Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Naomi Halas, Johannes Persson, Christelle Prinz, Bengt E Y Svensson, and Niklas Vareman for valuable comments and suggestions. A special thanks to Pascal Engel and Kevin Mulligan for inspiration and time for reflection.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Medical Ethics, Lund University, BMC C13, 22184, Lund, Sweden

    Prof. Nils-Eric Sahlin (Faculty of Medicine)

  2. Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Prof. Nils-Eric Sahlin (Faculty of Medicine)

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  1. Prof. Nils-Eric Sahlin
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Correspondence to Nils-Eric Sahlin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Sabine Roeser

  2. Philosophy Department, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Sabine Roeser

  3. Human Technology Center, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Rafaela Hillerbrand

  4. Department of Plant Physiology and Forest Genetics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

    Per Sandin

  5. Section for Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Martin Peterson

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Sahlin, NE. (2012). Unreliable Probabilities, Paradoxes, and Epistemic Risks. In: Roeser, S., Hillerbrand, R., Sandin, P., Peterson, M. (eds) Handbook of Risk Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-007-1432-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1433-5

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