Abstract
Chapter 7 provides a characterization of the informal logic movement, started in the late 1970s by a group of philosophers in North America. The term informal logic refers to a collection of attempts to develop a method for the analysis and evaluation of natural language arguments that offers an alternative to formal logic.
In Sect. 7.2 the historical backgrounds of the informal logic movement are sketched. The scholars who played an important role in creating the movement are mentioned, and an overview is provided of the main issues that have been the subject of investigation.
In the remaining sections of the chapter, the contributions made by the most prominent informal logicians are discussed. Sect. 7.3 gives a description of Johnson and Blair’s RAS criteria for the evaluation of argumentation (relevance, acceptability, sufficiency) and Johnson’s additional dialectical criterion that to make argumentation rationally persuasive, an arguer should deal with objections. In Sect. 7.4 Finocchiaro’s historical and empirical approach to arguments is described, concentrating on the characteristics of his method of analysis of the use of arguments in scientific controversies. Sect. 7.5 discusses Govier’s view on the differences between formal and informal logic as well as her critical analysis of some key issues in informal logic: argument types, implicit premises, and fallacies.
Sect. 7.6 continues with a short overview of epistemological approaches to argument analysis and evaluation, which include Pinto’s influential approach. In Sect. 7.7 Freeman’s contribution to the study of the “macrostructure” of arguments and his views on argument acceptability are discussed. In his treatment of argument structure, Freeman uses a dialectical perspective which is inspired by the Toulmin model. He connects argument acceptability with presumption. Sect. 7.8 is about Walton’s work on argumentation schemes, dialogue types, and fallacies. Walton’s argumentation schemes represent forms of argument as they appear in everyday discourse, often in the form of semiformal defeasible inference rules with associated critical questions. In his dialogue typology, developed in cooperation with Krabbe, dialogue types are distinguished on the basis of differences in initial situation, overall goal, and the goals of the participants.
The chapter is concluded with three sections dealing with contributions by other prominent informal logicians. In Sect. 7.9, Hansen’s research of (the history of) fallacy theory is discussed and attention is paid to his ideas concerning the methods and key concepts of informal logic. Sect. 7.10 describes Hitchcock’s views concerning Toulmin’s notion of warrant, argument evaluation, and inference claims. Finally, in Sect. 7.11, Tindale’s proposal of a rhetorically grounded synthesis of the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical perspectives is discussed.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
In 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) was founded, which aims to promote research and teaching in the field of informal logic and critical thinking.
- 7.
- 8.
Critical thinking requires additional abilities, such as obtaining and assessing information and clarifying meanings (Johnson 2006, p. 250). Moreover, according to some authors, critical thinking requires specific dispositions (Ennis 1987) – or a specific outlook. Siegel (1988, p. 39) refers to this outlook as “the critical spirit.”
- 9.
In his informal logic bibliography, Hansen (1990) provides an overview of the main topics of interest to informal logicians.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
One of the insights resulting from looking at fallacies in this way is that not all arguments which share some formal characteristics of a fallacy are indeed fallacious. A personal attack, for instance, is not fallacious if it is made to cast doubt on the credibility of a witness in a court case.
- 13.
They are also called the ARG conditions (“G” for (sufficient) grounds).
- 14.
In formal logic, the concept of relevance is also used, but the definition of this concept is somewhat different from that of informal logicians. It is applied to the relation between the antecedent and consequent of implications.
- 15.
Another criticism of the relevance criterion is that the concept of relevance is too vague and no satisfactory account of this concept has been given (Woods 1994).
- 16.
Another reason for Hamblin to reject truth as a criterion is that it is an “onlookers’ concept” and “presupposes a God’s eye view of the arena” (1970, p. 242).
- 17.
In Johnson (2000, pp. 336–340) the problem of possible tensions between applying both a truth and an acceptability criterion in the evaluation of arguments is discussed. Application of the two criteria may lead to conflicting outcomes: Premises may be false, but acceptable, or true but unacceptable.
- 18.
Blair and Johnson (1987, pp. 50–53) tried to resolve this problem of epistemological relativism by requiring that the arguers address not merely the individual other but a community of interlocutors who hold well-informed beliefs about the subject under discussion and who exhibit certain traits of reasonableness. The notion of a community of model interlocutors bears close resemblance to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of universal audience. According to Tindale, however, the fact that, unlike in Perelman’s approach, in Blair and Johnson’s proposal there is no connection between the ideal audience and the immediate audience “makes it an unattractive proposal for a rhetorical approach to argumentation” (1999, p. 117).
- 19.
In the 1994 edition of their textbook Logical Self-Defense, Johnson and Blair specify three ways in which an argument can lack sufficiency, which entail criteria of sufficiency: Premises, taken together, are not sufficient to support the conclusion if they do not provide evidence which has been systematically gathered by an appropriate method, if they do not supply a sufficient sample of the various kinds of relevant evidence, or if they ignore the presence of, or the possibility of, contrary evidence (Johnson and Blair 1994, p. 72).
- 20.
In “Argumentation as Dialectical,” Blair and Johnson (1987) already advocated a dialectical approach to argumentation. They then sketched the outlines of a dialectical account of sufficiency that bears strong resemblance to Johnson’s later notion of dialectical tier (pp. 50–53). However, in Johnson’s (2000) view, the dialectical obligations the arguer should fulfill in his dialectical tier are not intended to replace the original account of sufficiency, but form an additional criterion of evaluation.
- 21.
In reaction to the criteria for dialectical adequacy presented in an earlier paper by Johnson (1996, pp. 264–266, a republication of Johnson, 1992), Govier had argued that these criteria are in fact no criteria, since they offer no guidance as to how one can establish whether the arguer has adequately dealt with objections, alternative positions, and consequences (1999, p. 215).
- 22.
In pragma-dialectics, pragmatic insights play the contextualizing role that Leff ascribes to rhetorical insights. By making use of insights from speech act theory, it becomes possible to establish which “disagreement space” is involved in the argumentation and thus to specify what is at stake in argumentative discourse (see Sect. 10.3 of this volume).
- 23.
According to van Rees, Johnson’s account is not truly dialectical either, since Johnson sees producing reasons and discharging one’s dialectical obligations as different things, whereas in a truly dialectical account, argument per se would be seen as an attempt to take away (anticipated) objections and doubt (2001, p. 233).
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
In chapters containing critical essays, Finocchiaro (2005a) discusses the work of Perkins, Massey, Siegel, Cohen, Gramsci, Barth and Krabbe, Freeman, Arnauld and Nicole, the Amsterdam School, Walton, Johnstone, Goldman, Johnson, Hamblin, Shapere, and Popper.
- 27.
Apart from her contributions to informal logic, Govier has written on a number of topics in social philosophy, including trust, forgiveness, and reconciliation. We shall not address these writings here.
- 28.
- 29.
Apart from the key issues discussed in this section, Govier (1985) addresses in her textbook also the issues of how to distinguish argumentation from explanation, how to pin down an argument(ation) structure, how to evaluate arguments on the basis of the RAS criteria, how to diagram arguments, how to use insights from formal logic, and how to apply methods of argument assessment within the contexts of the social sciences and social life.
- 30.
In addition, Adler’s contribution should be mentioned (e.g., Adler 2013).
- 31.
In composing this part of the section, we have made use of the overview of epistemological approaches provided by Lumer (2005) as the guest editor’s introduction to two consecutive special issues on the epistemological approach to argumentation of the journal Informal Logic: 25(3) and 26(1).
- 32.
For an elaborate description of these approaches, see Chap. 5, “The New Rhetoric” and Chap. 10, “The Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation”, respectively. Consulting these chapters will also make clear that the criticisms made by representatives of the epistemological approach address only a small part of the insights developed in these approaches.
- 33.
For more specific criticisms of the “consensus approach”, in particular of pragma-dialectics, see Siegel and Biro (1997, 2008, 2010) and Lumer (2010, 2012). For a response to these criticisms, see Garssen and van Laar (2010), Botting (2010, 2012), van Eemeren (2012), and also Chap. 10, “The Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation” of this volume.
- 34.
The word “prosbatic” derives from the Greek prosbatos (accessible).
- 35.
- 36.
According to Lumer, plausibilist and prosbatic criteria are both necessary in order to describe what makes up a good argument: “The structural, plausibilist criteria may be considered as defining an instrument, i.e. the argument, that in principle is apt to fulfill the standard function of argumentation. The situational, prosbatic criteria, on the other hand, can be seen as rules for using this instrument: In which (epistemic) situation can the instrument be used to really fulfill the standard function?” (2005, p. 196, original italics). Scholars in favor of a combination of the two types of criteria include Lumer (1990) and Johnson (2000).
- 37.
- 38.
See Lumer (2005, pp. 203–204) for references to works dedicated to these specific fallacies.
- 39.
For Freeman’s response to Toulmin, see Sects. 11.4 and 11.10 of this volume.
- 40.
See also Sect. 11.2 of this volume on Pollock’s undercutting and rebutting defeaters.
- 41.
See also Chap. 11, “Argumentation and Artificial Intelligence”, in particular Sects. 11.5 and 11.6, of this volume.
- 42.
The list draws on the list presented in Chap. 3 of Walton’s (1996a) Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Argumentation, which counts 25 headings, and mentions references for each scheme (most of them to other publications by Walton, some to work by other researchers).
- 43.
Attempts have been made to further systematize the list of argumentation schemes and the associated critical questions, for instance, in the field of artificial intelligence (see Sect. 11.5 of this volume) and in a pragma-dialectical fashion (Wagemans 2011b).
- 44.
See also Chap. 11, “Argumentation and Artificial Intelligence”, in particular Sects. 11.5 and 11.10 of this volume.
- 45.
Hansen has also played an important editorial and organizational role in the informal logic movement. Apart from having published a bibliography of informal logic (1990), he is one of the editors of the journal Informal Logic and co-organized nine conferences of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA).
- 46.
For an exposition of Aristotle’s theory of fallacies, see Sect. 2.4 of this volume.
- 47.
For an explanation of Hamblin’s influential view on fallacies, see Sect. 3.6 of this volume.
- 48.
Hitchcock’s interest in argumentation is clearly not just academic, but also inspired by social and political values: “Free and open rational discussion, welcoming criticism and willing to change in the light of that criticism, is the most secure route to correct views and wise policies” (2002b, p. 298).
- 49.
A more recent publication is Reason’s Dark Champions: Constructive Strategies of Sophistic Argument, in which Tindale (2010a) analyzes the Sophists’ strategies of argumentation.
- 50.
In Tindale (2004, pp. 89–114) a detailed analysis of Bakthin’s idea of dialogism is presented.
- 51.
A similar remark is made by Blair (2000, p. 200) in his review of Tindale (1999): “I have trouble understanding how the universal audience constructed out of the particular audience adds anything beyond the arguer’s own sense of what it would be reasonable for that audience to accept in that cognitive environment.”
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van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E.C.W., Henkemans, A.F.S., Verheij, B., Wagemans, J.H.M. (2014). Informal Logic. In: Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5_7
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