Abstract
This chapter contains an introduction into argumentation theory. In Sect. 1.1, the topic of research is introduced. Starting from the meaning of the word “argumentation” in ordinary language, a more technical definition is provided of the term argumentation as it is for research purposes used in argumentation theory. In this definition, argumentation is connected with communication, interaction, accountability, and reasonableness.
In Sect. 1.2, the descriptive and the normative dimensions of argumentation theory are distinguished. The various components of the research program that needs to be carried out to combine the descriptive and normative interests are described. Apart from philosophical and theoretical research concentrating on the standards of reasonableness and empirical research, concentrating on the description of argumentative reality, to bring the two dimensions together, analytical research is required, followed by practical research aimed at exploiting the insights gained for improving methodically the analysis, evaluation, and production of argumentative discourse.
In Sect. 1.3, some crucial concepts in argumentation theory are discussed: “standpoints,” “unexpressed premises,” “argument schemes,” “argumentation structures,” and “fallacies.” It is explained that in the various approaches to argumentation, these concepts may be conceived in somewhat different ways.
In Sect. 1.4, the main approaches are distinguished that have developed throughout the history of argumentation theory. The overview starts with the classical approaches to logic, dialectic and rhetoric in Antiquity, and the neoclassical approaches manifested in modern logic, the Standard treatment of the fallacies as explained by Hamblin, the analysis of controversy proposed by Crawshay-Williams, and Naess’s semantic analysis of differences of opinion and the reasons put forward to resolve them. Next, the still influential theoretical perspectives are discussed that were proposed by Toulmin in his model of argumentation and by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the new rhetoric. In the next chapters, the theoretical approaches to argumentation are explained that have been developed after Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca published their influential proposals: first the various kinds of formal approaches, such as formal dialectic, and then informal logic, communication studies and rhetoric, the linguistic approaches developed in French-speaking and Italian-speaking parts of the world, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, the recent interaction of argumentation theory and artificial intelligence, and the contributions from other disciplines which are in some ways related to argumentation theory, such as critical discourse analysis, persuasion research, and cognitive psychology after the “argumentative turn.”
In Sect. 1.5, a brief overview is presented of the content of the various chapters of the handbook.
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- 1.
In our usage, if they are to be taken seriously, people who put forward argumentation can always be held to trying to resolve a difference of opinion, even if they only go through the motions, and a communicative activity that is not aimed at resolving a difference of opinion is not considered as argumentation.
- 2.
A difference of opinion can be overt and expressed explicitly, but it may also be covert and remain implicit.
- 3.
Among the counterparts of “argumentation” are in French “argumentation,” in German “Argumentation,” in Italian “argomentazione,” in Portuguese “argumentação,” in Spanish “argumentación,” in Dutch “argumentatie,” and in Swedish “argumentation.”
- 4.
Our survey of the characteristics of argumentation is based on van Eemeren (2010, pp. 25–29).
- 5.
Without jumping to unjustified conclusions about the relationship between language and thinking, it can be observed that the linguistic differences concerned may have an impact on how argumentation is viewed and can be of influence on the theorizing.
- 6.
Because Dutch is our native language, we tend to rely in our comparisons with English usage in the first place on similarities and differences with Dutch. Our observations, however, apply equally to other languages.
- 7.
This does not mean, of course, that in practice argumentation cannot be abused, so that in these cases there is no matter of acting reasonably.
- 8.
See, for instance, the description of “argument” in Negotiation: An A-Z Guide as “a destructive form of debate” (Kennedy 2004, p. 22). Some negotiations, the guide observes, “never get beyond argument.” According to Hample (2003, p. 448), ordinary arguers connect the English term argument with “a close-minded pursuit of victory by one or both parties.”
- 9.
Resolving a difference of opinion does not mean aiming for a happy state of mutual consensus that puts the argumentative process to a definitive end. Later on, the outcome achieved may not be considered satisfactory, so the argumentative process is continued. On other matters the argumentative process will continue to go on anyway.
- 10.
As Tindale (1999, p. 45) explains, it is “the European fashion” to refer to the premises of an argument as the argumentation and to the conclusion by using another term, such as standpoint.
- 11.
There is no reason, for instance, for jumping to Sapir-Whorf-like conclusions regarding the relationship between language and thinking.
- 12.
- 13.
Although the terms rational and reasonable often seem to be used interchangeably, we think that it is useful to make a distinction between acting “rationally” in the sense of using one’s faculty of reason and acting “reasonably” in the sense of utilizing one’s faculty of reason in an appropriate way. Acting reasonably presupposes acting rationally while observing at the same time the appropriateness standards prevailing in the exchange concerned.
- 14.
If only because arguers may want to realize at the same time other, non-argumentative aims, such as being viewed as nice or intelligent.
- 15.
Even in seemingly irresolvable controversies known as “deep disagreements,” the parties usually keep pretending that they are trying to resolve their difference of opinion on the merits, so that they cannot be accused of being unreasonable by the outside world.
- 16.
Our definition, which is based on van Eemeren (2010, p. 29), covers vital characteristics of argumentation emphasized in nontechnical definitions of argumentation as an attempt at rational persuasion or at influencing (or convincing) others by providing good reasons to justify a claim.
- 17.
If argumentation is expressed verbally, this act complex has both a propositional content and a communicative function (“illocutionary force”), just like most other speech acts, whether they are elementary or complex (in the sense of compound). A set of speech acts only constitutes a complex speech act of argumentation if both the propositional content of the constellation of propositions involved and their joint communicative function meet the pertinent “identity conditions” (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 29–46).
- 18.
Næss (1966) uses the term arguments for the separate propositions that together constitute an argumentation, but because of the diffuse meaning of the English word “argument,” this is confusing.
- 19.
Whether standpoints are descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive, they can always be reconstructed as a claim to acceptance (van Eemeren 1987b).
- 20.
Some theorists suggest otherwise. As Tindale (2004, p. 174) puts it, “Those most eager to enlist a truth requirement among their criteria of argument evaluation are those who see truth as the principal aim of argumentation.”
- 21.
Argumentation generally has no major role to play in discussing a claim to acceptance when a decisive solution can readily be offered otherwise.
- 22.
Besides varying in nature, standpoints also vary in firmness (“It is certain that…” versus “If you ask me…”) and scope (“All…” versus “At least some…”).
- 23.
Following Barth and Krabbe (1982, p. 75), we call the prerequisites for reasonable argumentative discourse regarding the participants’ state of mind second-order conditions and the prerequisites regarding the communicative situation third-order conditions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 189).
- 24.
Nevertheless argumentation theory can be instrumental in laying bare cases in which the preconditions for reasonable argumentative discourse have not been fulfilled.
- 25.
These two dimensions are reflected in the dual norm for the reasonableness of argumentative moves: adequacy in resolving a difference of opinion (“problem validity”) and intersubjective acceptability (“conventional validity”) (Barth 1972, and Barth and Krabbe 1982, pp. 21–22). See Sect. 3.8, “NÌss on Clarifying Discussions”.
- 26.
The five components of a fully fledged research program in argumentation theory were introduced in van Eemeren (1987a).
- 27.
The philosophical tripartition used here is based on Toulmin (1976), who, in fact, distinguished between these three approaches when dealing with the problem of giving an account of reasons for believing something.
- 28.
Only in case of a purely descriptive theory, the empirical research could be aimed at testing the model, but so far no fully fledged argumentation theory without a critical dimension has been developed.
- 29.
In case the focus is on a unique historical text or discussion, i.e., a specific speech event, qualitative research is in principle the only appropriate kind of empirical research (although quantitative data may play a part).
- 30.
The descriptive aims of argumentation theory are often associated with the “emic” study of what is involved in justifying claims and what are to be considered good reasons for accepting a claim viewed from the “internal” perspective of the arguers while the normative aims are associated with the “etic” study of both matters viewed from the “external” perspective of a critical theorist.
- 31.
Basically, these general objectives were already formulated in van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1978, p. 24).
- 32.
It is important to realize that verbal expressions are not “by nature” standpoints, arguments, or other argumentative moves, but only when they serve a specific function in the communicative context in which they are used.
- 33.
For a more detailed definition of a standpoint as a (complex) speech act in terms of identity and correctness conditions see Houtlosser (2001, p. 32).
- 34.
In principle, conclusions end a piece of reasoning, whereas standpoints get the discussion (and the argumentation) started. When standpoints are presented (“retrogressively”) after the argumentation has been put forward, in the analysis a reconstruction is required which puts the standpoint first, because it occasions the argumentation.
- 35.
Starting from Habermas’s theory of communicative action, Kopperschmidt uses the term thesis in the same sense as standpoint, the only difference being that he does not reconstruct a thesis as an assertive but as a “virtualized validity claim” (Kopperschmidt 1989, p. 97).
- 36.
The term opinion, however, is used in different ways. As Blair has pointed out to us (personal communication), a physician’s medical diagnostic opinion carries a burden of proof. Schiffrin’s analysis applies to a usage in which opinion is not equivalent to (disputable) belief.
- 37.
According to (Daniel) O’Keefe, a prominent persuasion scholar, attitudes are not innate characteristics, but residues of experience (2002, pp. 18–19).
- 38.
For a more detailed overview of the study of standpoints and similar concepts, see Houtlosser (2001).
- 39.
The word “enthymeme” (enthymema), which originally denoted a thought or consideration, is nowadays used for a piece of reasoning (not just a syllogism) in which some part is suppressed.
- 40.
For further considerations on a logical analysis of unexpressed premises, see Hitchcock (1980a).
- 41.
- 42.
For the various kinds of resources that can be used in accounting for the reconstruction of unexpressed premises and other elements of argumentative discourse, see van Eemeren (2010, pp. 16–19).
- 43.
For a more detailed overview of the study of unexpressed premises, see Gerritsen (2001).
- 44.
- 45.
For a more detailed overview of the study of argument schemes, see Garssen (2001); for attempts at formalization and the computational implications, see Walton et al. (2008, Chaps. 11, “Argumentation and Artificial Intelligence” and 12, “Research in Related Disciplines and Non-Anglophone Areas”).
- 46.
This characterization of the difference between the two approaches of argumentation structure is based on exchanges we have had with J. Anthony Blair (personal communication).
- 47.
Reasons support a standpoint independently if the unacceptability of any of them does not affect the argumentative strength of any of the others.
- 48.
Remarkably, Govier (1992) considers also analogies as linked.
- 49.
In deductive reasoning the premises need to be taken together to constitute a “defense” of the conclusion, whereas in inductive reasoning, each of the premises plays its own role in making the conclusion more or less probable.
- 50.
Because in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation it depends on the doubt and criticism arguers respond to, and the way in which they deal with this doubt and criticism, what the structure of their argumentation will be, this approach can be seen as a sequel of the functional approach chosen in the theory of stasis (and continued in the theory of debate).
- 51.
Within coordinative argumentation put forward to meet criticism concerning the sufficiency of the reasons advanced in defense of a standpoint, a distinction can be made between a “direct” defense, in which the arguer attempts to meet the criticism by adding so many more reasons that together they should suffice, and an “indirect” defense, in which the arguer adds one or more reasons in order to refute counterarguments. In agreement with a suggestion made by Blair and Pinto in an unpublished manuscript, Snoeck Henkemans (1992) calls the argumentation in the first case cumulative and in the second case complementary.
- 52.
Although the various kinds of argumentation structures distinguished in pragma-dialectics are to some extent similar to those distinguished in informal logic, the differences in conceptualization complicate a one-to-one translation of the terminologies of pragma-dialectics and informal logic into each other.
- 53.
As Blair pointed out to us (personal communication), the American legal theorist Wigmore (1931) introduced argument diagramming already in 1913, long before Beardsley.
- 54.
For a more detailed overview of the study of argumentation structures, see Snoeck Henkemans (2001).
- 55.
Because some of the fallacies on Aristotle’s list are intrinsically linked with the dialogue situation, one of the consequences of abandoning the context of debate is that the reason why a particular fallacy should be regarded as a fallacy may have become obscure.
- 56.
- 57.
For a more detailed overview of the study of fallacies, see van Eemeren (2001).
- 58.
Our brief sketch of Aristotelian logic, dialectic, and rhetoric is largely based on van Eemeren et al. (2010). See Chap. 2, “Classical Backgrounds” for a more elaborate treatment.
- 59.
This does not exclude that persuasion can also be a goal.
- 60.
According to Berger (1977, p. 3), logicians usually define arguments in the first place as lists of sentences, one of which is regarded as the conclusion and the rest as the base for that conclusion. Argumentation theorists claim that there is more to argumentation.
- 61.
Schiappa (2002), for one, confesses that he identifies argumentation theory with doing rhetoric and that he finds it hard to differentiate between the two.
- 62.
An important impetus to the empirical study of argumentation in persuasion research is given by Daniel O’Keefe. He tested experimentally the recognition of argumentative moves and used more recently “meta-analysis” to check the validity of certain theoretical claims made by argumentation theorists (O’Keefe 2006).
- 63.
See, for instance, the essays concerning the relationship between the two perspectives collected in Dialectic and Rhetoric (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, Eds., 2002).
- 64.
See van Eemeren (2010) and the literature discussed in Chapter 3 of that monograph.
- 65.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use the Latin equivalent loci.
- 66.
At first named Informal Logic Newsletter.
- 67.
The extent to which the rules for critical discussion are capable of dealing with the defective argumentative moves traditionally designated as fallacies is viewed as a test of their “problem-solving validity.” For experimental empirical research of the “intersubjective acceptability” of the rules for critical discussion that lends them “conventional validity,” see van Eemeren et al. (2009).
- 68.
The infrastructure of the field of argumentation theory in terms of academic associations, journals, and book series reflects to some extent the existing division in theoretical perspectives. The American Forensic Association (AFA), which is associated with the National Communication Association, and its journal Argumentation & Advocacy concentrate on argumentation, communication, and debate. The Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT), and the electronic journal Informal Logic focus on informal logic. The International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), the journals Argumentation and Journal of Argumentation in Context, and the accompanying book series Argumentation Library and Argumentation in Context aim to cover the whole spectrum of argumentation theory. Other international journals relevant to argumentation theory are Philosophy and Rhetoric, Logique et Analyse, Argument and Computation, Controversia, Pragmatics and Cognition, Argument and Computation, and Cogency.
- 69.
It is the argumentation theorists’ task to specify the criteria a rational judge needs to apply in evaluating argumentation. As no one holds the monopoly for the use of the term valid or any of its equivalents, they can give these terms the meaning they think to agree best with their theoretical approach.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E.C.W., Snoeck Henkemans, A.F., Verheij, B., Wagemans, J.H.M. (2014). Argumentation Theory . In: Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5_1
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