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Kant on Recognition

  • Carla BagnoliEmail author
Living reference work entry
  • 4 Downloads
Part of the Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften book series (SPREFGEIST)

Abstract

According to Kant, respect is the mode of recognition of others as rational agents, capable of setting their ends and holding moral status. Respect accounts for the subjective experience of morality as the experience of being at the same driven and bound by the recognition of others as equals. In this capacity, respect works both as a moral incentive and as a constraint on deliberation, which derives from the recognition of others as free to choose their own ends.

Keywords

Kant Recognition Respect Rational agency Moral status 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio EmiliaModenaItalien

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