Finanzpolitik

Living reference work entry

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag liefert einen Überblick über die politik- und wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung zur Erklärung staatlichen finanzpolitischen Handelns. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass die durch den politischen Prozess erzeugten finanzpolitischen Entscheidungen sich häufig von jenen Maßnahmen unterscheiden, welche eine rein an Effizienzkriterien ausgelegte ökonomische Analyse empfehlen würde. Die Untersuchung der politik-ökonomischen Determinanten der Finanzpolitik erlaubt ein besseres Verständnis staatlichen Handelns und ermöglicht die Formulierung wissenschaftlich fundierter Reformvorschläge. Einige davon werden am Ende des Beitrags diskutiert.

Schlüsselwörter

Wohlfahrtsökonomik Optimalsteuertheorie öffentliche Güter öffentliche Verschuldung Fiskalregeln Finanzpolitische Institutionen Finanzpolitik Politik-ökonomische Analyse Finanzpolitische Reformen 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für PolitikwissenschaftLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMünchenDeutschland
  2. 2.Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. MikroökonomikBTU Cottbus-SenftenbergCottbusDeutschland

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