Skip to main content

The Cliometric Study of Financial Panics and Crashes

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Handbook of Cliometrics
  • 2246 Accesses

Abstract

Financial crises present an identification challenge. On one hand, declines in economic activity often lead to bank failures, while on the other, bank failures often lead to declines in economic activity. To understand the causes of crises and determine their influence subsequent growth, it is vital to untangle these various factors. Approaches require well-constructed empirical models as well as knowledge of existing data and institutions. Each section of this chapter highlights empirical approaches that have been successfully used to study specific aspects of financial crises. Starting with survival and hazard functions, the chapter goes on to cover data envelopment analysis, vector autoregressions, instrumental variables, and difference-in-difference models.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As a result, they produce opposite coefficients from the traditional discrete choice models. A positive coefficient, therefore, implies a negative relationship between the covariate and failure.

  2. 2.

    Hanes and Rhode (2013) show that financial panics often coincide with exogeneous in cotton harvests.

  3. 3.

    The authors take a typical approach by including the log of assets to control for size and using balance sheet ratios to control for how portfolio compositions varied across banks.

  4. 4.

    The addition of dummy variables for the number of years in operation to binary choice models has been used to approximate the same type of relationship.

  5. 5.

    Alternatively, models can assume that the explanatory variables affect the time directly (often called accelerated time models). Similar to the duration models, however, these models must assume a distribution.

  6. 6.

    This description is taken from Wheelock and Wilson (2000) which also used a DEA.

  7. 7.

    It is important to note that the model is relatively sensitive to outliers that would push the frontier out too far.

  8. 8.

    Given the varying frequencies, each observation is a bank-month.

  9. 9.

    The approach was first developed in Kaplan and Meier (1958).

  10. 10.

    Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010) is another good example of the use of VARs to model the causes and effects of financial panics using Great Depression data.

  11. 11.

    The authors use the asymptotic chi-square test developed by Sims (1980) for the determination of lag order.

  12. 12.

    Often variables are ordered more exogenous to least exogenous but this in itself must be based on the authors’ opinion.

  13. 13.

    Cointegration (i.e., the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables) is often tested using the approach suggested by Johansen (1991).

  14. 14.

    In systems with cointegtation, a VAR model with first differences is misspecified. However, Engle and Granger (1987) show that a VAR in levels avoids the problem.

  15. 15.

    For instance, Kupiec and Ramirez (2013) apply a panel VAR to study financial panics across the various states.

  16. 16.

    While these two equations could be estimated with OLS separately, the standard errors would not be estimated correctly because the second-stage estimates would take into account the fitted values instead of the original endogenous variable.

  17. 17.

    The drawbacks are that the estimate of the effect of the Atlanta Fed’s action would only be based on within plant variation and the limited number of observations available to study.

References

  • Anari A, Kolari J, Mason J (2005) Bank asset liquidation and the propagation of the U.S. great depression. J Money Credit Bank 37:753–773

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernanke BS (1983) Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the great depression. Am Econ Rev 73:257–276

    Google Scholar 

  • Bordo M, Wheelock DC (1998) Price stability and financial stability: the historical record. Fed Reserve Bank St Louis Rev 80:41–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Bordo M, Landon-Lane JS (2010) The lessons from the banking panics in the United States in the 1930s for the financial crisis of 2007–2008. NBER working paper no 16365

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Calomiris C, Gorton G (1991) The origins of banking panics: models, facts, and bank regulation. In: Glenn Hubbard R (ed) Financial markets and financial crises. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 109–174

    Google Scholar 

  • Calomiris C, Mason JR (2003a) Consequences of bank distress during the great depression. Am Econ Rev 93:937–947

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calomiris C, Mason JR (2003b) Fundamentals, panics, and bank distress during the depression. Am Econ Rev 93:1615–1646

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson M (2004) Are branch banks better survivors? Evidence from the depression era. Econ Inq 42:111–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carlson M, Mitchener K (2009) Branch banking as a device for discipline: competition and bank survivorship during the great depression. J Polit Econ 117:165–210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chari VV, Kehoe P, McGrattan E (2002) Accounting for the great depression. Am Econ Rev 92:22–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole H, Ohanian L (2000) Re-examining the contributions of monetary and banking shocks to the U.S. great depression. In: Bernanke BS, Rogoff K (eds) NBER macroeconomics annual 2000, vol 15. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 183–227

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox DR (1972) Regression models and life-tables. J R Stat Soc 34B:187–220

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox DR (1975) Partial likelihood. Biometrika 62:269–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engle R, Granger C (1987) Cointegration and error-correction: representation, estimation, and testing. Econometrica 55:251–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M, Schwartz AJ (1963) A monetary history of the United States: 1867–1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanes C, Rhode P (2013) Harvests and financial crises in gold standard america. J Econ Hist 73:201–246

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jalil A (2010) A new history of banking panics in the United States, 1825–1929: construction and implications. PhD dissertation, University of California-Berkley

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaremski M (2010) Free bank failures: risky bonds vs. undiversified portfolios. J Money Credit Bank 42:1565–1587

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johansen S (1991) Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegrating vectors in Gaussian vector autoregressive models. Econometrica 58:1551–1580

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan EL, Meier P (1958) Nonparametric estimation from incomplete observations. J Am Stat Assoc 53:457–481

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiefer N (1988) Economics duration data and hazard functions. J Econ Lit 26:646–679

    Google Scholar 

  • Kupiec P, Ramirez C (2013) Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: evidence from 1900 to 1930. J Financ Intermed 22:285–307

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchener K (2005) Bank supervision, regulation, and instability during the great depression. J Econ Hist 65:152–185

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS (2009) This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Richardson G, Troost W (2009) Monetary intervention mitigated banking panics during the great depression: quasi-experimental evidence from a federal reserve district border, 1929–1933. J Polit Econ 117:1031–1073

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rockoff H (1972) The free banking era: a reexamination. Dissertations in American History, revised PhD dissertation, University of Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Rolnick A, Weber WE (1984) The causes of free bank failures: a detailed examination. J Monet Econ 14:269–291

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shephard RW (1970) Theory of cost and production functions. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Sims CA (1980) Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 62:520–552

    Google Scholar 

  • Sims CA, Stock JH, Watson MW (1990) Inference in time series models with some unit roots. Econometrica 58:113–144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sprague OMW (1910) History of crises under the National Banking System. National Monetary Commission, S.Doc. 538, 61st Cong., 2d session

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber WE (2005) Listing of all state banks with beginning and ending dates. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, http://research.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/economists/wewproj.html

  • Wheelock D, Wilson P (1995) Explaining bank failures: deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency. Rev Econ Stat 77:689–700

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wheelock D, Wilson P (2000) Why do banks disappear: the determinants of U.S. bank failures and acquisitions. Rev Econ Stat 82:127–138

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicker E (1996) The banking panics of the great depression. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wicker E (2000) Banking panics of the gilded age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ziebarth N (2013) Identifying the effect of bank failures from a natural experiment in Mississippi during the great depression. Am Econ J Macroecon 5:81–101

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Matthew Jaremski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this entry

Cite this entry

Jaremski, M. (2016). The Cliometric Study of Financial Panics and Crashes. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40406-1_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics