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Consciousness

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Southern Indiana, Evansville, IN, USA

    Rocco J. Gennaro

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  1. Rocco J. Gennaro
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Correspondence to Rocco J. Gennaro .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Oakland University , Rochester, Michigan, USA

    Jennifer Vonk

  2. Department of Psychology, Oakland University Department of Psychology, Rochester, Michigan, USA

    Todd Shackelford

Section Editor information

  1. Bard College, Annandale-On-Hudson, NY, USA

    Sarah Dunphy-Lelii

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Gennaro, R.J. (2018). Consciousness. In: Vonk, J., Shackelford, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_1611-1

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