Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks

Living Edition
| Editors: Xuemin (Sherman) Shen, Xiaodong Lin, Kuan Zhang

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

  • Hamed Shah-Mansouri
  • Vincent W. S. WongEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_29-1



Budget feasible mechanisms refer to procurement combinatorial auctions in which the auctioneer with a limited budget chooses a subset of items with the goal of maximizing its valuation.


Mobile and wireless systems are evolving at a rapid pace due to the tremendous growth of data traffic. The exceedingly large number of devices and the emergence of new applications and services make the design and management of wireless systems even more challenging. However, traditional models are not capable of supporting future systems such as fifth generation wireless networks and Internet of Things (Wong et al., 2017).

Auction theory is an applied branch of mathematics and is promising for design, management, and economic analysis of wireless systems. Auction theory is widely applied in different areas of mobile and wireless systems including mobile crowdsensing (e.g., Shah-Mansouri and Wong 2015;...

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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringThe University of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

Section editors and affiliations

  • Jianwei Huang
    • 1
  • Yuan Luo
  1. 1.Department of Information EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong Kong, StainHong KongChina