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Auction

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Synonyms

Bidding; Transaction

Definitions

Auction is a concept from microeconomics, referring to the practice of buying and selling goods through the process of bidding. Auction participants include buyers, sellers, and the auctioneer, and the role of the auctioneer may be assumed by the seller, especially if there is a single seller. An auction mechanism is a series of rules specifying how an auction is conducted. The three most important components of an auction mechanism are the determination of the winners, the allocation of items, and the payment.

Historical Background

Auction is deemed as an effective way to assign items to buyers who value them the most. According to different numbers of participants, auctions can be categorized into three settings.

  • Forward auction. One seller, who also acts as the auctioneer, and multiple buyers.

  • Reverse auction. One buyer, who also acts as the auctioneer, and multiple sellers.

  • Double auction. Multiple buyers, multiple sellers, and a...

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References

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Correspondence to Yanjiao Chen .

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Chen, Y., Zhang, Q. (2018). Auction. In: Shen, X., Lin, X., Zhang, K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_27-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_27-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-32903-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-32903-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Computer SciencesReference Module Computer Science and Engineering

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