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Political Connections, Corruption, and Tax Practices

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Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

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Synonyms

Tax aggressiveness: an aggressive form of tax avoidance or tax management.

Tax shelters: techniques used by taxpayers to decrease their taxable incomes (e.g., investing in exempt sectors or a tax haven).

Definitions

Political connections may take several forms including the presence at least of one politician (e.g., a member of parliament, a minister, a president, a king, and any other top appointed bureaucrat in the government), in firm’s ownership structure, board of directors or audit committee.

Corruption is defined as an act in which one agent typically pays a sum of money or performs a service in exchange for an illicit act by a public official (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui 2006).

Tax evasion is defined as the illegal practices to escape from taxation that can occur in an isolated incident within the activity or in the informal economy where the whole activity takes place in an informal manner (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui 2006).

Tax avoidanceoccurs when taxpayers use the...

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics and Management of Mahdia, University of Monastir, Monastir, Tunisia

    Hichem Khlif

  2. Faculty of Economics and Management of Sfax, University of Sfax, Sfax, Tunisia

    Ines Amara

Authors
  1. Hichem Khlif
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  2. Ines Amara
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hichem Khlif .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, USA

    Ali Farazmand

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Khlif, H., Amara, I. (2018). Political Connections, Corruption, and Tax Practices. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3617-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3617-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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