Definition
The corruption is acts in which public power is used for personal gains in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain 2001, 73). It is the principal-agent model that is most often used as a methodological framework for modeling corrupt behavior. In the principal-agent model, the payoff to the principal depends on an action taken by the agent. The mainstream of the corrupt behavior modeling is model of bureaucratic corruption, which considers agent as potential bribee and examines its behavior for given regulation.
Introduction
From a great many definitions of corruption, we select the typical one: “The corruption is acts in which public power is used for personal gains in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain 2001, 73). The above-cited author suggests that there are two forms of corruption, each occupying extreme positions on a scale of corrupt activities:...
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Ivanov, A. (2017). Typology of Agency Models of Corruption. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2787-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2787-1
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