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Chen, J., Johnson, T. (2016). Political Ideology in the Bureaucracy. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2473-1
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