Introduction: Politics Not Complexity
The legislative study of government regulation is largely dominated by the following question: why and under what conditions do legislators delegate regulatory power to independent commissions and/or executive bureaucracies? One of the most obvious and frequently cited drivers of delegation is the increasingly complex and dynamic nature of modern society. Given that the time and resources of lawmakers are scarce, they may find it difficult to craft coherent policy responses to the social risks and market failures created by unceasing socioeconomic change. As a result, delegation to specialized nonlegislative actors with high levels of policy expertise can be a net positive for legislators, particularly when policies are technically complex and their effects uncertain (Bawn 1995). Legislators can indirectly provide policies that both interest groups and citizens demand without becoming consumed...
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Lockhart, L. (2016). Legislative Study on Government Regulation. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1083-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1083-1
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