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Synonyms

Constitutionalism; Court Power

Introduction

Judicial review refers to the power provided to the judicial branch to formally examine and potentially overturn the work of the legislative or the executive branches of government, generally for nonconformity with the constitution or other higher sources of law. From its roots in the United States, the global spread of judicial review has been nothing short of transformative for modern governance, with courts as much as legislatures or governments now responsible for determining policies within society. Yet, both theoretically and practically, the institution of judicial review brings up difficult issues for modern government, particularly democratic government. Paraphrasing President Lincoln, democratic government can be thought of most directly as “government by the people and for the people.” However, through the process of judicial review, judges – unelected actors in nearly all societies – end up holding a veto over the laws...

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Correspondence to Benjamin Bricker .

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Bricker, B. (2016). Judicial Review. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1034-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1034-1

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