Abstract
This chapter seeks to articulate a theory of anticipation for asymmetric conflicts. Drawing on insights associated with complexity theory as well as social science critique, it argues that asymmetric conflicts are complex in ways that symmetric conflicts are not and this increase in complexity makes prediction practically impossible. However, an understanding of how the relevant communal narratives of the factions in conflict make sense of this complexity can allow one to anticipate how a conflict will unfold and how it will end. Anticipating the course of such conflicts requires understanding how the different ends impact the character of war one is fighting and how that character impacts the relationship between military means and political ends. What fills the gap between what the military can do and the political objective it is trying to achieve is the communal narrative, which articulates collective identity and in so doing identifies the kinds of things that threaten it and thus what a population will likely fight for regardless of cost. Understanding how these narratives “fit” together allows one to organize the relevant military, political, social, and cultural information in ways that make the current state of the conflict intelligible, which is necessary to anticipating its future course.
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Pfaff, C.A. (2017). Anticipation in Asymmetric Warfare. In: Poli, R. (eds) Handbook of Anticipation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31737-3_75-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31737-3_75-1
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