Synonyms
Definition
Moral foundations theory is a descriptive theory about the diverse contents of moral psychology, particularly moral judgment. It contends that human moral judgment (a) is primarily an intuitive, non-rational process, and (b) can be broken down into discrete categories of moral intuition that each process different types of moral stimuli and that function to sustain features of human sociality. Extant theory posits five core domains of moral intuition, geared toward the processing of information pertaining to: (i) harm versus care; (ii) fairness versus cheating; (iii) loyalty versus betrayal; (iv) authority/respect versus subversion; and (v) purity/sanctity versus degradation.
Introduction
Moral foundations theory (MFT) was developed by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues to describe the wide array of human moral judgments, values, and behaviors in terms of underlying moral intuition and emotion. It...
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Simpson, A. (2020). Moral Foundations Theory. In: Zeigler-Hill, V., Shackelford, T.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_1253
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