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Arrow Theorem

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Definition

Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem is one of the most famous and important contributions in economics. It concerns the difficulty to aggregate a set of individual preferences, given as rankings of a set of available alternatives, into a unique social preferences ranking via a social welfare function or into a unique social choice. Arrow proves that in a specific framework, it is impossible to find a social welfare function which simultaneously satisfies four conditions: universal domain, weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictator. Our notice presents this theorem, one of its proofs, and some of its effects on law and economics and, we hope, invites the reader to discover social choice theory.

Introduction

Kenneth Arrow (1921–2017) was one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century. In 1972, with J. Hicks, he received the Sveriges Bank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel at aged 51 and remains its youngest recipient....

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Biocore Team, Université Côte d’Azur-INRIA, Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France

    Pierre Bernhard

  2. CRESE EA3190, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Besançon, France

    Marc Deschamps

Authors
  1. Pierre Bernhard
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  2. Marc Deschamps
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marc Deschamps .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Bernhard, P., Deschamps, M. (2020). Arrow Theorem. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_754-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_754-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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