Skip to main content

Naïve Consumers (Contract Economics)

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
Book cover Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
  • 80 Accesses

Abstract

Consumers are viewed as a weak contract party by both lawyers and economists, although with some distinctions. The unconscionability theory addresses consumers’ naïvety, to be intended as partial or total incapacity of understanding contract terms, as a reason for public intervention. Economists as well agree that law must protect consumers against sellers’ abuses, especially when contracts contain add-ons or are preprinted and no bargaining is allowed.

How law should intervene is still an open question. On the one hand, lawyers point out that courts should not enforce contract clauses literally but rather should replace them with terms that consumers could have reasonably expected and approved. On the other hand, economists focus on how sellers exploit naïve consumers and warn that regulation may turn out pejorative if it is not able to educate naïve consumers or if it allows the seller to raise the price up when forced to offer good terms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Armstrong M, Chen Y (2009) Inattentive consumers and product quality. J Eur Econ Assoc 7(2–3):411–422

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Agostino E, Seidmann DJ (2016) Protecting buyers from fine print. Eur Econ Rev 89:42–54

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellison G, Ellison SF (2009) Search, obfuscation and price elasticities on the internet. Econometrica 77(2):427–452

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gabaix X, Laibson G (2006) Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets. Q J Econ 121:505–540

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Korobkin R (2003) Bounded rationality, standard form contracts, and unconscionability. Univ Chicago Law Rev 70:1203–1295

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Elena D’Agostino .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Science+Business Media LLC

About this entry

Cite this entry

D’Agostino, E. (2017). Naïve Consumers (Contract Economics). In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_709-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_709-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics