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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1–9Cite as

Type-I and Type-II Errors

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Abstract

Adjudicative procedures meant at establishing truth about facts on defendants’ behavior are naturally prone to errors: defendants can be found guilty/liable when they truly were not (type-I errors) or they can be acquitted when they should have been convicted (type-II errors). These errors alter the incentives of defendants to comply with norms. We review the literature with a particular focus on type-I errors.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LUMSA University, Rome, Italy

    Matteo Rizzolli

Authors
  1. Matteo Rizzolli
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Correspondence to Matteo Rizzolli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Rizzolli, M. (2018). Type-I and Type-II Errors. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_66-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_66-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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