Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Commons, Anticommons, and Semicommons

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_532-1

Abstract

The notions of commons, anticommons, and semicommons are presented here to highlight their connections concerning how forms of ownership beyond the classical boundaries of private property affect the management of resources. While the three concepts have been presented as expressing specific dilemmas for the management of the resources or distinct property regimes, they may be seen as components of a unified interpretative framework which recognizes resources as collection of multiple attributes and addresses the complexity of mixed property regimes by studying the interaction of common and private uses.

Keywords

Europe Manure Harness Metaphor 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”University of TorinoTorinoItaly