Abstract
Budgetary institutions encompass two different types of institutional arrangements: fiscal rules and budget process rules. Fiscal rules entail substantive constraints on public spending, taxation, deficit and debt, usually in the form of explicit quantitative targets. Budget process rules, in turn, entail procedural aspects of public budgeting: they establish the competencies of the actors involved in the budget process and outline the procedures that govern the preparation, adoption and implementation of the budget. This entry gives an overview of the different forms and characteristics of these institutions and also of their impact on budgetary outcomes.
References
Alesina A, Perotti R (1996) Fiscal discipline and the budget process. Am Econ Rev 86(2):401–407
Alesina A, Perotti R (1999) Budget deficits and budget institutions. In: Poterba JM, von Hagen J (eds) Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Anderson B, Minarik JJ (2006) Design choices for fiscal policy rules. OECD J Budget 5(4):159–203
Bird G, Mandilaras A (2013) Fiscal imbalances and output crises in Europe: will the fiscal compact help or hinder? J Econ Policy Reform 16(1):1–16
Buchanan JM, Wagner RE (1977) Democracy in deficit. Academic, London
Calmfors L, Wren-Lewis S (2011) What should fiscal councils do? Econ Policy 26(68):649–695
Corbacho A, Schwartz G (2007) Fiscal responsibility laws. In: Kumar MS, Ter-Minassian T (eds) Promoting fiscal discipline. IMF, Washington, DC
Debrun X, Hauner D, Kumar MS (2009) Independent fiscal agencies. J Econ Survey 23(1):44–81
Fabrizio S, Mody A (2006) Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline? Econ Policy 21(48):689–739
Hallerberg M (2004) Domestic budgets in a united Europe: fiscal governance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Hallerberg M, von Hagen J (1999) Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits in the European Union. In: Poterba JM, von Hagen J (eds) Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Hallerberg M, Strauch R, von Hagen J (2007) The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries. Eur J Political Econ 23(2):338–359
Hallerberg M, Strauch R, von Hagen J (2009) Fiscal governance in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Kopits G, Symansky S (1998) Fiscal policy rules. IMF, Washington, DC
Larch M, Turrini A (2010) The cyclically adjusted budget balance in EU fiscal policymaking. Intereconomics 45(1):48–60
Ostrom E (1986) An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48(1):3–25
Poterba JM (1995) Balanced budget rules and fiscal policy: evidence from the States. National Tax J 48(3):329–337
Raudla R (2010a) Constitution, public finance, and transition. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main
Raudla R (2010b) Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom? Eur J Law Econ 30:201–221
Schick A (2003) The role of fiscal rules in budgeting. OECD J Budget 3(3):7–34
Schuknecht L (2005) Stability and growth pact: issues and lessons from political economy. Int Econ Econ Policy 2(1):65–89
Tullock G (1959) Some problems of majority voting. J Polit Econ 67(6):571–579
Velasco A (2000) Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking. J Public Econ 76(1):105–125
von Hagen J (2002) Fiscal rules, fiscal institutions, and fiscal performance. The Econ Social Rev 33(3):263–284
von Hagen J (2007) Budgeting institutions for better fiscal performance. In: Shah A (ed) Budgeting and budgetary institutions. The World Bank, Washington, DC
von Hagen J (2008) European experiences with fiscal rules and institutions. In: Garrett E, Graddy A, Jackson HE (eds) Fiscal challenges: an interdisciplinary approach to budget policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
von Hagen J, Harden I (1995) Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline. Eur Econ Rev 39(3–4):771–779
Wagner RE (2002) Property, taxation, and the budgetary commons. In: Racheter DP, Wagner RE (eds) Politics, taxation, and the rule of law: the power to tax in constitutional perspective. Kluwer, Boston
Wyplosz C (2005) Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules. National Inst Econ Rev 191:64–78
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this entry
Cite this entry
Raudla, R. (2014). Budgetary Institutions. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_517-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_517-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences