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Protective Factors

Abstract

Protective factors help people achieve positive outcomes despite exposure to potentially negative influences (in medicine, good health in spite of smoking cigarettes; in the social sciences, productive adult lives as law-abiding citizens despite adverse conditions during childhood and adolescence). In Law and Economics, the concept, in conjunction with control theories, contributes to a better understanding of why economic actors obey the law and comply with rules despite exposure to material incentives to the contrary. Protective factors can result from external sources (social control) and internal sources (internalized conventional values). They generate nonmaterial benefits in the case of compliance and/or nonmaterial costs in the case of noncompliance. The inclusion of protective factor into regulatory analysis – in combination with the consideration of risk factors that work in the opposite direction – helps to understand why some regulatory regimes work better than others. The concept can be especially useful when it comes to designing regulatory innovation based on a better understanding of why some economic actors obey the law and others don’t.

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Correspondence to Norbert Hirschauer .

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© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Hirschauer, N., Scheerer, S. (2014). Protective Factors. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_387-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_387-2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Protective Factors
    Published:
    28 July 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_387-3

  2. Protective Factors
    Published:
    24 December 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_387-2

  3. Original

    Protective Factors
    Published:
    29 September 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_387-1