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Politicians

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
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Definition

Politicians are persons involved in the process of public policymaking in their role as members of governments, parliaments, political parties, and other political bodies at the (sub)national level (e.g., local government, state legislature, national parliament, etc.) as well as within the supranational political arena (e.g., United Nations Security Council, European Union institutions, and so on). Many politicians get into office through a democratic election, while others are selected or appointed to a public office. For many politicians, politics is a full-time job, while for others, it remains an activity in addition to a main job as a lawyer, teacher, or entrepreneur. This entry takes stock of what law and economics (LE) scholars have contributed to the large social science literature on politicians.

The Law and Economics of Politicians

Analyzing what politicians do belongs to the “core business” of political scientists. However, the law and economics discipline has...

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Correspondence to Benny Geys .

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Geys, B., Mause, K. (2017). Politicians. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_370-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_370-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Politicians
    Published:
    19 August 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_370-2

  2. Original

    Politicians
    Published:
    13 March 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_370-1