Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Leniency Programs

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_297-1

Abstract

Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits cartels and other antitrust agreements that reduce or eliminate competition between firms. Leniency programs are an important investigative tool which give cartel’s members incentives to report their cartel activity and cooperate with competition authorities. We present their main objectives, their development in different countries, their direct and indirect effects and how these programs could be improved.

Keywords

Welding Europe 
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References

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Further Reading

  1. Brisset K, Thomas L (2004) Leniency program: a new tool in competition policy to deter cartel activity in procurement auctions. Eur J Law Econ 17(1):5–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  5. Leliefeld D, Motchenkova E (2010) Adverse effects of corporate leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry. J Appl Econ Sci 5(2(12)):114–128Google Scholar
  6. Motchenkova E, Van der Laan R (2011) Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect. Int Rev Econ 58:401–431CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Spagnolo G (2002) Leniency and whistle-blowers in antitrust. CEPR Discussion Papers 5794, C.E.P.R. Discussion PapersGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies EconomiquesUniversity of Franche-ComtéBesançonFrance