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Imitation

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Abstract

Imitation is an idea adopted or derived from an original one and is a necessary tool for disseminating knowledge. The existence of imitation may lower the monetary returns of innovators and remove their creation incentives. This gives the rationale for the intellectual property right (IPR) protection system, whereby the returns of innovators can be secured and the incentives to innovate can be improved. The pertinence of such a viewpoint is, however, in doubt in some of innovative industries, such as software, computers, and semiconductors. Institutions that govern the creation and diffusion of inventions (knowledge) should balance the trade-off between IPR protection and imitating diffusion.

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Correspondence to Jen-Te Yao .

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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Yao, JT. (2016). Imitation. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_241-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_241-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Imitation
    Published:
    26 November 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_241-2

  2. Original

    Imitation
    Published:
    03 June 2016

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_241-1