Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Legal Origin

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_199-1

Abstract

Flexible common law is considered to be more conducive to external investment than more rigid civil law. However, both systems can either adapt to new situations or become less flexible over time. Legal systems function best, when there is sufficient room for revision and review.

Keywords

Financial Development Hedge Fund Private Equity Legal Origin Relationship Banking 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Brouwer M (2006) Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy law. Eur J Law Econ 22(1):5–20 (is original publication)Google Scholar
  2. Brouwer M (2008) Chapter 7: Executive pay and tenure; founding fathers, mercenaries and revolutionaries. In: Governance and innovation. Routledge Studies in Global Competition; Executive Pay and Tenure; Founding Fathers, Mercenaries and Revolutionaries, pp 120–140Google Scholar
  3. Brouwer M (2012) Ch. 4. Corporate finance and the theory of the firm. In: Organizations, individualism and economic theory. Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy; Corporate Finance and the Theory of the Firm, pp 64–83Google Scholar
  4. Buetter M (2002) Cross border insolvency under English and German law. Oxford University Comparative Law ForumGoogle Scholar
  5. Djankov S, LaPorta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2002) The regulation of entry. Q J Econ 117(1):1–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. LaPorta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1997) Legal determinants of external finance. J Financ 52(3):1131–1150CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. LaPorta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1998) Law and finance. J Polit Econ 106(6):1113–1155CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. LaPorta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2008) The economic consequences of legal origins. J Econ Lit 2:285–332Google Scholar
  9. Mahoney PG (2001) The common law and economic growth; Hayek may be right. J Leg Stud 30(2):503–525Google Scholar
  10. Meijer G, Meijer S (2002) Influence of the code civil in the Netherlands. Eur J Law Econ 14:227–236CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Raghuram R, Zingales L (1998) Financial dependence and growth. Am Econ Rev 3:559–586Google Scholar
  12. Raghuram R, Zingales L (2003) The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the 20th century. J Financ Econ 69(1):5–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.AmsterdamThe Netherlands